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Musical Ambiguity  
and Musical Analysis 
 
I want to talk about what we analyze when we analyze a piece of music. But I need to 
approach this question by first clearing away some assumptions that normally—and perhaps 
quite rightly—keep us from addressing the issue. The influence of (indeed, indebtedness to) 
the later thought of Wittgenstein will be evident to those familiar with it, particularly 
Philosophical Investigations, part II, and the notes from his last few months published under 
the title On Certainty.1 But of course Wittgenstein is not to be blamed for my use of the tools 
he devised. 
 
Suppose we are sitting under an apple tree when an apple suddenly appears on the ground 
beside us. You say that the apple fell from the tree, though neither of us has seen it fall; I 
insist that it has welled up from the ground like fairy gold. I am clearly mistaken about a fact. 
It doesn’t matter whether I know anything about apples and where they come from—I am 
making a mistake. (Even if an apple were to appear on the ground in a forest when no one 
was there, I would be mistaken to assert that it had welled up from under the ground. Even if 
I am really just “telling a story,” you are quite justified in saying I am making a mistake as 
long as I allow you to think my explanation is of the same kind as yours.) In this example, a 
mistake is simply a lack of correspondence between a statement that is supposed to represent 
what is the case and what is in fact the case. 
 
To return to our scene in the woods: Later, when a number of apples have fallen to the 
ground, we begin to play a game with them. The game involves grouping the apples in certain 
ways and not others. At one point in the game, I group the apples in a way the game does not 
allow. I am not making a mistake about a fact; I am showing that I don’t know how to play 
the game. 
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 Recall that in everyday life we sometimes let others admit to a mistake rather than to 
ignorance—as a way of their saving face—but of course this is not what is really going on. It 
is just that it seems a lesser gaffe to make a mistake about a fact than not to know how to do 
something (such as play a game). 
 Someone might say that I don’t understand the game. But, aside from perhaps making 
me feel better, does this accomplish anything? Does it, for instance, give us a better picture of 
what is going on? Surely it is simpler just to say that I don’t know how to play the game 
(despite my feelings) and leave it at that. To talk of “understanding” is more like talking of a 
situation where there are facts about which I can be mistaken—except that, in the case of 
understanding, the “facts” are somehow inside me. A game does not consist of facts. 
Disentangling making a mistake about something on the one hand and misunderstanding 
something on the other is very difficult and fortunately not necessary, as long as we 
distinguish both of these from not knowing how to play a game. 
 Another difficulty that is best avoided for the most part is the whole question of 
following rules. For present purposes, when I speak of someone as knowing how to play a 
game I imply that that person acts in accord with the rules, without experiencing them as 
limitations. For instance, no speaker of standard English ever says “Me saw her,” and it is not 
something that anyone has to think about to avoid. Compare “You and me, we saw her,” 
which, though it is nonstandard, sounds like English, whereas “me saw” does not. “Me saw” 
definitely breaks a rule; “You and me, we . . .” might at most be called “poor form.” Or 
maybe there is a conflicting rule about using the objective case when “pointing” for 
emphasis, as in “Me [put thumb to chest], I saw her.” Notice that a rule is not something that 
you have to know as such, as long as you know how to play the game. That is why it makes 
more sense to think of rules as descriptions of what people do and don’t do when playing a 
given game even though the term seems to belie this. 
 So if I know how to play our game, I simply won’t make an unallowable grouping of 
apples. I might make an ill-advised grouping but not a wrong one. If I know how to play the 
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game, but, say, due to impairment of some kind—being distracted or drunk—I do make a 
wrong grouping, it is not a case of my making a mistake (as if I were to say, “Oh, I thought I 
could group them like that!”) but a case of my being able to say quite literally, “I do know 
how to play the game, but I am not myself right now.” 
 
In one sense, games consist of the manipulation of objects (like apples)—in other words, of 
moves. But we can also manipulate objects in our heads, as when we read the moves of a 
chess game that has already taken place. All that is required is that we know how to play the 
game. 
 Notice that when we replay the game of a master in our heads it is not required that 
we should have been able to play that particular game in the first place. We are still playing 
the game in the sense of manipulating objects. 
 Yet we want to say that there is a difference between playing and replaying. 
 Suppose that instead of replaying a game in their heads, two average chess players 
replay a game that had been played by two great masters. They memorize the moves and act 
out their parts very convincingly (perhaps adopting little “eccentricities of genius” in their 
manners and seeming to think intensely before they make their moves). We are watching 
them. You claim that they are not really playing the game because they don’t fully understand 
the moves; I maintain to the contrary that they are playing. (This time, at least I am certainly 
not making a mistake.) 
 Now suppose that two great masters are playing. Because there are a finite number of 
moves in chess, and because, in fact, certain series of moves constitute part of the strategy of 
the game, these two masters find themselves replaying for a number of moves the game that 
two other masters played previously. Since I obviously don’t understand the difference, let us 
say that you happen to enter the room just as this replay begins and then have to leave just as 
it ends. If you consider the replay in this case somehow different from the other, how do you 
know? Suppose the two masters are replaying a segment of a game they themselves had 
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played before; or suppose it is with the roles reversed, so that each is making the moves the 
other had made previously; or that only one of the two is replaying an earlier game. 
 Let us go back to the case of the two amateur players replaying a game between two 
masters. Suppose at some point one of the players makes a new move (that is, does not replay 
the previous game). As a result, the game proceeds differently after that. Are they now 
suddenly playing, whereas before they were not? Does it make a difference whether this was 
caused by a memory slip or a burst of enthusiasm? If it was a memory slip, was it a 
mistake?—the move didn’t correspond to the “script”—is the rest of the game a mistake 
(even if you want to say that they are really playing for the first time)? 
 Although we want to say that there is a difference between playing and replaying, it is 
difficult to pinpoint where the difference lies. The obvious answer of chronology dissolves 
when we think about it: Even the masters’ game might be only the first recorded instance of 
that particular series of moves. Even if we could establish some way of distinguishing 
between play and replay, how would we apply it with certainty? After all, we admit the 
possibility that in playing, an average player might have an “inspired” moment or some 
extraordinary “luck” and so play “like a master”; certainly a master might be “off stride” one 
day and play hardly better than an average player. No one will find this as difficult to allow as 
that apples well up from under the ground—that simply doesn’t happen! 
 Although it seems to make sense to say that this person plays better than that one, it 
doesn’t make sense to say that this person knows the moves better. One either knows the 
moves or not; expertise resides somehow in playing. Again, one can make the wrong move in 
the sense of giving one’s opponent an advantage, but one who knows how to play chess will 
not, say, move the rook diagonally. 
 
Suppose that one of the amateur chess players starts giving an evidently extempore running 
commentary about the play—not just a description of the moves but a discussion of the 
strategy involved. All of the onlookers (who all know how to play the game and also 
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recognize this as a replay) find the talk informative and convincing—except for you. Now I 
think I am justified in saying that you are carrying skepticism too far; to be frank, I am 
beginning to wonder whether you really know how to play the game. 
 
Suppose it were the norm to replay chess games in the way I described. There might be a 
tendency as a result to pay attention to the accuracy of repetition—to notice “mistakes”—
perhaps at the expense of appreciation of the game itself. But surely the game itself would 
remain the same. The difficulty we have distinguishing play and replay might seem to 
decrease in this case, but that would be an illusion based on the assumption that we ought to 
pay attention to the accuracy of repetition when it is clear we should not. 
 In fact it is the norm to replay chess games, but only in our heads, as we said before. It 
might even be that we sometimes give ourselves a running commentary in our heads as we 
play—but it would be wrong to think of that as constituting the game. 
 
Giving a running commentary is not something we usually do when playing a game. But 
there are unusual situations in which we seem to be forced to do it. When Wittgenstein 
discussed the well-known optical illusion of the duck-rabbit, he pointed out that this was a 
special case of “seeing as,” that is, “Now I am seeing it as a duck; now I am seeing it as a 
rabbit.” But he denied that we usually see this way: “It would have made as little sense for me 
to say ‘Now I am seeing it as . . .’ as to say at the sight of a knife and fork “Now I am seeing 
this as a knife and fork.’ ”2 It is the specially designed “ambiguous” picture that seems to call 
for a running commentary, whereas usually running commentary is both unnecessary and 
quite peculiar. 
 In the case of a game being played with running commentary, a reverse illusion may 
be created: Because I try to explain the moves of the game I may come to believe that my 
explanation is part of the game and in fact causes the moves. In speaking about a piece of 
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music, for example, I might very easily slip from saying “this is what I heard” to saying “I 
heard it as this.” 
 
In an early sketch for the Philosophical Investigations called the “blue book” (from the color 
of its binder), Wittgenstein makes the point that grammatical parallelisms can mislead us to 
expect parallel experiences.3 This is most a problem when we are examining experience 
theoretically—that is, giving a running commentary. 
 To show how we can be misled, he asks us to compare parallel questions and the 
nonparallel responses they get: (1) “How do you know he [as opposed to someone else] has 
pain?”—“He is moaning.” (2) “How do you know you have pain?”—“I feel it.” 
 It is not just that different sorts of “evidence” are offered in the two replies; notice the 
shift of emphasis in the second pair. “I feel it” is as peculiar a reply as “I am moaning” would 
be. 
 Music analysis, however, often wants to pretend that one can say the equivalent of “I 
am moaning” sensibly—in other words, give a running commentary as if it were objective 
evidence. Unfortunately, analysts do of course say, “I hear it as . . .” (and are discouraged 
from saying “I hear it [that way]”—which is the only sensible thing to say, even if it cannot 
be justified). 
 What is under scrutiny in this passage of the “blue book” (as in much of 
Wittgenstein’s late work) is the theoretical stance and, in particular, its limits. In a manner of 
speaking, theory (from , to look into, observe, contemplate) “desires” to see through 
to the common element beneath surface diversity. But suppose (Wittgenstein is saying) there 
is no common element, that there are only “family resemblances,” which can be made to 
seem identical only under misleadingly parallel questioning. Theory’s desire will tend to 
overwhelm its reason (as sexual desire has been known on occasion to overcome rational 
arguments against incest, for example). 
* 
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That last comment was mine, not Wittgenstein’s (better get back to chess and music). 
 Like chess, music doesn’t consist of facts for us but of moves (or “motions,” as we 
call them). The factual aspects of music—fluctuations of atmospheric pressure caused by 
vibrating bodies and converted into nerve impulses that our brains interpret as sounds—are 
so far from coinciding with what we mean by the word as to make it faintly ludicrous even to 
mention them. 
 We can extend the analogy of music with chess somewhat further, saying that one of 
the versions of the music game is tonality, individual games are pieces of music, and the 
players are composers and performers. But since we have found it so difficult to distinguish 
play and replay in the case of chess (with a corresponding difficulty distinguishing players 
and replayers, i.e., composers and performers of music), perhaps we should let one category 
encompass two whose distinctness begs so many questions. Seeing performers as 
(re)composers simply carries the problem forward, as if in disguise. It seems to make sense, 
however, to call composers performers—that is, players of the game of tonality and, in the 
instance of a particular piece of music, the first performers. 
 This may still trouble you. Therefore, let us see if we can undermine our conflation 
and force ourselves to accept the “commonsense” view of players and replayers (that is, 
composers and performers) as distinct at least insofar as we are talking about music. 
 1. One might object that composition is distinct from performance in that, before a 
composer writes out a piece of music, nothing exists for the performer to perform—
composition is a precondition of performance. 
 Suppose a composer sits down at the piano one day and improvises. Later, the 
composer writes out exactly the same pitches, rhythms, dynamics, and so on. It is clear that 
the piece existed as a performance before it was written out although the agent of both was in 
fact a composer. 
 Now suppose someone else had improvised the piece first (without the composer’s 
having heard it). One might object that it is unlikely a performer of (one assumes) lesser 
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ability could have improvised a piece that a “genius” like Beethoven struggled to write out 
over the course of months or even years. Again, I don’t want to deny what seem the obvious 
differences in people’s ability to play the game. But suppose Mozart sat down and 
improvised a piece that Haydn later wrote out (not having heard his friend’s improvisation). 
One may object that each had his own style and would therefore not have created the same 
piece in this way. Very well, suppose Mozart’s improvisation had been deliberately in the 
style of Haydn. (Does one want to deny that Mozart could have done it?) 
 Add to these hypothetical arguments, if you will, that composers often speak of 
writing down a composition as if by dictation; that they speak of seeing a piece as a whole in 
a flash of inspiration; that they speak of revision as a process of getting closer to the “original 
idea.” One needn’t accept a literal-minded Platonic interpretation to see that the composer’s 
experience with respect to the piece is not sufficiently distinct from the performer’s 
experience of it in performance to be called something else. (To make a very rough analogy, 
one way to understand Schenker’s conception of levels of structure is to think of levels closer 
to the foreground as performances of more remote ones.) We probably have the different 
words composer and performer only because of the obvious but superficial differences 
between sitting alone at a desk writing and sitting before an audience playing. 
 2. Attacking from another direction, one might say that the composer provides a set of 
instructions; all the performer has to do is follow them to the letter and the piece will be 
realized—the performer as computer executing a “program.” 
 But almost no one who has performed a piece of music under any circumstances 
could accept this. (Nor could anyone who has heard a computer execute a music file!) Every 
performance differs; there is no such thing as a definitive performance. 
 When it happens that a piece I am performing doesn’t seem “new” to me, it is only 
that I’m not playing the game very well that day. This may seem to discount the role of 
memory in evolving a performance over time, but what I want to say is that memory is part of 
one’s commentary rather than part of one’s experience of playing: “I used to play it as that, 
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but now I play it as this.” Perhaps we imagine one “idea” replacing another in our heads (like 
one piece taking another on a chessboard)—but we really experience only our performance 
now. 
 
A better analogy for how one way of playing a piece replaces another is to how one note 
“replaces” another in our ears when we hear a tune. 
 
The idea of a definitive performance implies that “owning” a piece in this way is as good as 
being able to play the game—a philistine idea record companies naturally want us to buy 
even more than that we buy any particular performance.  
 And if record companies appeal to the bourgeois desire to own performances, then 
perhaps theory appeals in part to a desire to own the game of music itself. 
 
My title, “Musical Ambiguity and Musical Analysis,” may seem somehow incorrect. It seems 
right to speak of “musical ambiguity,” but we usually say “music analysis.” The difference is 
that ambiguity is supposedly in the music (a property of it), but analysis is of the music (treats 
it as an object). 
 Also, because musical, when used to speak of a person, connotes knowing how to 
play the game, if I refer to “musical analysis,” I imply (somewhat impolitely) that there is 
“unmusical analysis.” 
 Yet ambiguity cannot usually be in the music. A move in a game cannot be 
ambiguous—ambiguity can only arise in giving a commentary and then mistaking the 
commentary for the game (“I hear as this” instead of “I hear this”). Of course, a composer can 
create a musical situation in which we seem to be forced to give a commentary as with the 
duck-rabbit illusion, but the music is no more ambiguous than the lines on the paper that 
make up the drawing. 
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 It now appears that whereas we thought there was something wrong with my second 
term, it is really the first one that is wrong. Strictly speaking, there can be no musical 
ambiguity but only metamusical ambiguity. The ambiguity is not in the music but is an effect 
that arises in analysis (which may be musical or unmusical, depending on the analyst). 
 
You might object that my saying ambiguity is relatively rare implies that each piece has an 
individual and essential “nature” and that there is usually only one right way to hear it 
(perform it, etc.). But I maintain that it is just because a piece can only be experienced as a 
performance that it is not ambiguous. In contrast, only something that really is essentially 
some thing (like a wolf dressed up as Grandma) can be ambiguous, that is, can seem to be 
something it isn’t or can seem to be undecidable.  
 Not that a piece can be anything I say: My point is, baldly, that the need to decide is 
what creates ambiguity.  
 It may well be that the “most interesting” aspects of a piece are those that give rise to 
the most disagreement among analysts. But that begs the question “most interesting” to 
whom? (Presumably, to analysts seeking fodder for analytical disagreement.) 
 Within a vital artistic tradition—a description we might doubt now fits tonal music—
questions arise only at the edges, when great artists push the boundaries. This is where the 
evolution of a tradition takes place. The importance of such innovation can easily be 
overstated, however. (In keeping with the idea of creativity as innovative, it sometimes seems 
as if every doctoral dissertation in music theory is expected to establish a new “paradigm,” 
even though Kuhn stressed that most of science—“normal science”—is what occurs between 
paradigm shifts.) 
 We can also conceive that several subtraditions coexist within a tradition. Like 
dialects of a language, they would be mutually comprehensible for the most part but differ on 
fine points. One instance that has been suggested to me is the insoluble disagreement between 
those who hear tonic arrival as inherently strong metrically and those who do not. I can 
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accept the possibility of such variation within a tradition—but only with the proviso that what 
people say they hear when they set out to theorize and what they in fact hear can be very 
different. My caution is based on the perennial power of reification, on our disposition to find 
evidence that fits what we believe, and on the plain fact that it is so hard to say what we 
really hear. As Wittgenstein leads us to acknowledge, I can know equally well the height of 
Mont Blanc and what a clarinet sounds like, but I can’t say what I know equally well.4  
 In the transmission of the first kind of knowledge, my telling you the height of Mont 
Blanc gives you exactly the same knowledge as your going out with a ruler to measure it 
yourself. My telling you what a clarinet sounds like is, by contrast, hopeless; the only thing to 
do is to show you.  
 This is the basis of the distinction I once benightedly tried to make between stories 
(telling) and pictures (showing).5 
 Showing someone what a clarinet sounds like is most easily done by playing a 
clarinet; this would correspond to an “analysis” of a piece of music that consisted of merely 
playing the piece (the unachievable ideal that Hans Keller seemed to be striving toward). 
Actual analyses must be more ambitious: they are interpretive. Some would say that this is 
where the telling comes in, and to be sure, analysts do a lot of it—Schenker rather more than 
most. Schenker graphs, though, are not a telling but a more ambitious kind of showing how 
the music goes.  
 The knowledge transmitted in an analysis is like that of, say, a painting that tries to 
convey the sound of a clarinet. If you and I were both to do paintings of this sort, some other 
people might think yours conveyed the sound of a clarinet better than mine—was more 
“clarinetlike.” Similarly, one analysis may be more “convincing” or “musical”—closer to 
showing how the music goes—without having to establish an essential structure, that is to 
say, “the way the piece of music really is ‘in itself.’ ”  
 Of course, this begs the question—the same question that the expression knowing how 
to play the game has begged throughout this essay—of whom are we speaking? The best 
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judges of an analysis within a certain tradition of music (as of any performance) of a work 
within that tradition would be experienced listeners. This does not entail exclusion any more 
than it would to ask that someone who proposed to judge our clarinet paintings know what a 
clarinet sounds like.  
 I want to avoid being mistaken for some kind of arch-conservative, and by invoking 
tradition I have moved onto even thinner ice than I have been skating on until now. But one 
needn’t be making a fetish of tradition to acknowledge that it conditions experience. And I 
will assert that analysis is by definition a heuristic performance within a tradition; it is one of 
a family of practices conducted according to a governing ideology. In other words, analytical 
knowledge differs from other knowledge in having no truth value except the pseudo–truth 
values that exist within an ideological framework. (To return to Mont Blanc for a moment: its 
height has one true value—all propositions stating its height, though they may vary according 
to units of measurement, are equivalent; the sound of a clarinet has no truth value at all—any 
proposition we can offer will amount to the completely tautologous one that “a clarinet 
sounds like a clarinet.”)
6
 
 These pseudo–truth values do in fact exist; they inescapably condition our responses 
to the products of our culture. That means the music really does go a certain way (within 
certain tolerances) for experienced listeners. However, although the pseudo–truth values are 
inescapable, I don’t believe they are necessarily oppressive; remember that if traditions are 
“handed down,” they must also be “taken up”; they are not simply representations of what 
Marx called “false consciousness”—except inasmuch as they are mistaken for real truth 
values—because they provide a basis for human solidarity. In plain words, to do analysis is to 
share both pleasure and a kind of knowledge. 
 
Think of analysis as the elderly parent of a middle-aged child, theory. Theory is sincerely 
concerned for the welfare of analysis. (It is that very sincerity that makes theory a bit 
overweening in the relationship.) Theory doesn’t think it is safe for analysis to live alone 
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anymore and insists that analysis move in with it. My question is not whether theory is right 
or whether analysis is right to resist. Unlike those questions, the one I ask does have an 
answer: Given the circumstances, will analysis lose something by moving in with theory? 
 
I have allowed that a true ambiguity might occasionally exist in a piece of music. In such a 
case, “hearing anew” (playing the game) would dispose me to hear it as sometimes a “duck,” 
sometimes a “rabbit.” Even so, only a commentary would establish the shift of perspective. 
 The more common experience of hearing anew in tandem with memory is, however, 
closer to this: “Yesterday I heard a duck; today I hear a white mallard with lovely iridescent 
green and gold markings.” That is, through memory I seem to experience a filling in of 
detail—not that I literally hear detail I hadn’t heard before but that suddenly I “hear” how the 
detail takes its place as part of the whole. This is how a performer may be said to compose in 
the literal sense of to put together—and this is the sense in which the listener is a performer 
too. 
 
If music were normally ambiguous, it ought to be possible to perform A–B–C–D as both a 
fourth progression and a third progression ending in a neighboring motion simultaneously. 
That one can play it one way today and the other tomorrow does not constitute ambiguity 
unless you assume that it “really is” one or the other—or somehow both! Again, this is not to 
deny that one way may be better than the other (because, for example, it fits better with its 
context) but only to deny that it is better because it corresponds to the “true nature” of the 
music. 
 Compare a lepidopterist collecting specimens with a music analyst collecting readings 
from parts of a piece of music. As bits of evidence accumulate, a larger pattern may emerge 
in both cases. The analogy is flawed, however, because the pattern that emerges in scientific 
study is (one hopes) based on material relations—a given butterfly really is descended from 
and thus genetically related to some other butterfly. In contrast, even if one were to find a 
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chart in the composer’s hand showing the “evolution” of a motive, genetic relations in a piece 
of music can never be more than metaphorical. 
 A reading is better if it increases our pleasure in the piece; often a hidden unity in 
diversity is revealed. Unity is not the only source of pleasure in music, of course, but simple 
diversity is seldom as much fun as unity and diversity combined. 
 
Analyzing a piece of music is like giving a running commentary on a game that one is 
replaying in one’s head. The structure of a piece of music is an illusion that accompanies 
giving such a commentary—only the commentary has a structure. Or better, say that the 
commentary is the structure.  
 This is not to say that there can be no good (“musical”) analysis of a piece of music 
but only that such an analysis accompanies a performance by one who knows how to play the 
game and is convincing only inasmuch as the audience also knows how to play the game. A 
good analysis cannot tell us something we don’t already know (though we may not be aware 
that we know what we know, or may have forgotten it). 
 Remember that in playing a game one of the most exhilarating things is being 
reminded just how well one knows how to play. 
 
Isn’t analyzing music another “game” then? In a manner of speaking, yes, perhaps. But I 
would say it is a game of a different order. And it is not merely that it is a game that is 
dependent on another—a “metagame,” if you like. 
  Let us go back to chess and ask, Is it possible to play chess as something else? Surely, 
aside from such things as the pleasure of an intellectual challenge or the assuagement of a 
need to compete—which could find other outlets—the primary object of playing chess is to 
win. Inasmuch as chess players play for another reason (to humiliate their opponents; to gain 
fame and fortune), they are playing another game (not, strictly speaking, a “metagame,” 
however) in which winning a chess game is a move. 
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 It is clear that one can play the music “game” for similar reasons. The question 
remains, however, whether the existence of a different perspective (another game one is 
playing) means that one really plays the first game (chess, music) as. . . . Let us compare the 
situation with the duck-rabbit illusion, which also involves a shift of perspective but adds a 
commentary: “Now I am seeing it as a duck; now I am seeing it as a rabbit.” If I am “seeing 
as” in this way, I am not really seeing in the usual sense. Anyone who is playing chess well 
enough also to be playing the “humiliation” or the “fame and fortune” game must surely not 
play chess as, but simply play chess. (Chess masters are known for playing a number of 
games of chess at the same time—why not chess and the humiliation game at the same time 
as well?) 
 Music analysis, in contrast, entails commentary; it is always in danger of slipping into 
“hearing as.” It is difficult to imagine a player playing chess as (that is, making a chess move 
whose sole purpose was to advance the player’s prospect of gaining fame and fortune) and 
strictly as a result of doing so—winning at chess; it is not at all difficult to imagine a certain 
musical analysis being made as a move in another game—making an analysis that will be a 
good move in the “academic advancement” game, for example. In other words, in the case of 
chess, to win at the fame and fortune game you have to win the chess game too; in music 
analysis, you can win at the academic advancement game by “throwing” the analysis game. 




All this talk of “knowing how to play the game” may seem to establish a “privileged 
position.” Imagine someone who does not know how to play our first game (the one with the 
apples) watching us. “You’re just moving apples around,” this person might say, and many 
people are now saying that this is all that can be said without privileging some ideology. You 
might be surprised to read that I agree. 
 My point is different, that “knowing how to play the game” is a way of life, not a 
theoretical stance. Any theory, of course, will privilege some ideology as inescapably as any 
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physical position privileges some perspective, but this does not apply to unmediated 
experience. I know that there isn’t supposed to be such a thing, but I believe that plainly false. 
There is no experience about which we can say anything that is unmediated, yes, but I would 
go so far as to say that all experience, as such, is unmediated—except by the pervasive sorts 
of categories that Kant proposes, which are a priori to and part of any possible experience. 
Experience is the one thing we must privilege to avoid utter solipsism (and is, in fact, the one 
thing we do in practice usually privilege).  
 The theorist who says of our game “You’re just . . .” is obviously wrong. For the 
players to respond, however, would be to enter into the theoretical, and the discussion could 
only devolve to some form of “Are not”—“Are too”; that is, unless the response was simply 
“Learn the game.” 
 Thus, the two tendencies that lead to error in what is sometimes broadly described as 
“anti-foundationalism” are (1) the tendency to deny that there is any privilege whatsoever and 
(2) the tendency to want to privilege all theoretical stances equally (because, ironically, 
equally unprivileged). This vibration between opposing tendencies is caused by people being 
trapped in the inherent contradiction of trying to deconstruct theory theoretically (like 
Archimedes wanting a place to stand from which he could weigh the world). 
 Abstinence is our only recourse. Let us remember that, as with other dangerous 
practices in the real world, we do have checks on theory such that theory practiced with care 
maximizes the theoretical gain and minimizes the experiential loss. This is so clearly more 
desirable than its opposite that “safe” theory ought to be privileged unquestionably over 
“unsafe” theory. 
 Be that as it may, theory remains a dangerous practice. That we know it is so is one of 
the theoretical gains of our time; to desire to make it completely safe is, however, to privilege 
wishes over reality. 
* 
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I am not likely to say that a piece of music is ambiguous unless I am analyzing it. But when I 
say it I have already slipped from saying “this is what I heard” to saying “I heard it as this.” I 
have, in other words, slipped from a game I know how to play into a situation consisting of 
facts about which I can be mistaken. 
 Thus the use of the word ambiguity in music analysis—again, not always, but most 
often—is like the polite excuse we make for those who evince ignorance—we say they must 






This essay grew out of a number of years of thought about the philosophical bases of 
Schenkerian analysis, particularly work I did in connection with my dissertation.8 I sketched 
the outlines there, but when an article based on the dissertation was published, I was 
persuaded to drop the sketchy discussion and to promise in a footnote a future treatment.9  
 In the event, this essay was for the most part written very quickly (and in an entirely 
unexpected form) during the first few days following the second Schenker Symposium, at the 
Mannes College of Music (March 27–29, 1992). It then underwent an aging process—
perhaps the only advantage a nonacademic theorist like myself has—and is now about as 
smooth as I can make it. “Ambiguity” was very much in the air at the symposium. While I 
would like to think that I have netted it once and for all, this is certainly a vain hope, for 
anyone who has taken the trouble to reason along with me will no doubt be aware that I have 
made some of the same points as Carl Schachter in his essay “Either/or.”10 Obviously, I have 
made the points here in an entirely different and far less musically sophisticated way, but it 
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